The British Special Forces that won the Napoleonic Wars

The early nineteenth century was the era of the light infantryman. This was a time when small arms were sophisticated enough for a skilled sharpshooter to pick his targets out to a hundred yards or more, but not yet accurate enough for this to be easy. The quality of light troops could decide the outcome of a campaign, and this was certainly true of the Peninsular War, in which the French Legions of Napoleon Bonaparte did battle with King George’s armies on the sunbaked hills of Spain. It was there, where the fate of the Iberian peninsula was being decided, that the green-jacketed sharpshooters made their mark on history, standing out from among the red-coated regulars of the British Army as they went above and beyond the call of duty to bring about old Boney’s downfall. Join us today as we investigate the British light regiments that confounded Napoleon’s best generals in Portugal and Spain, as well as the trailblazing general who oversaw their training. The green-clad 95th Rifles were the pride of the British Army during the Peninsular War and stand front and centre in the collective consciousness of military history enthusiasts. It is easy to see why their reputation has endured for two centuries since that conflict. Armed with the iconic Baker rifle and the motto of “first in, last out”, the Rifles represented a facet of warfare in which Britain was undeniably superior to its French adversary. Their success must not blind us to two realities. Firstly, the 95th was one of several highly skilled light infantry units that Britain had at its disposal during the war. Second, the British light infantry system underwent significant improvement around the turn of the nineteenth century. This is the story of the light infantry regiments that confounded Napoleon’s best generals in the Peninsular War and the barracks at Shorncliffe on the south coast of England at which they were trained. This is also the story of John Moore, the general who made Britain’s light infantry reforms possible. Moore died on the battlefield before the benefits of his training were fully realised. Nevertheless, Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington and a man not often willing to share the limelight with other generals, recognised that “we should never have won without him. ” John Moore had a varied military career prior to the establishment of the Shorncliffe training camp in late 1802. He fought briefly yet bravely in the American War of Independence as a young lieutenant in the 82nd. Serving as Major in the 51st, he took part in the 1794 invasion of Corsica. Two years later, he was sent to the West Indies under General Ralph Abercromby, who appointed him Governor of St Lucia. However, this posting was cut short by a fever that almost killed him. Moore served in Ireland between December 1797 and June 1799 and played a key role in putting down the Irish Rebellion of 1798. During a time of mounting oppression towards Ireland’s native Catholic population, Moore stood in favour of greater legal equality between Irish Catholics and Protestants and clamped down on meetings of the sectarian Protestant ‘Orange Boys’ when they were discovered within his ranks. Moore’s pre-Shorncliffe career put him in good stead to oversee light infantry training. Consequently, he took the opportunity to pen a light infantry manual whilst stationed in Ireland. Much of that conflict was spent chasing Irish irregulars across the hills of Wexford, something the militia companies under Moore’s command weren’t cut out for. The manual Moore produced was a precursor to the hybrid of light and regular battalion drill that would later be characteristic of the Shorncliffe system. He intended to create “a mixture of Yager and Grenadier,” as stated in the manual’s introduction. Moore was a forward-thinking officer in a time where British military doctrine was dominated by strategically conservative men like David Dundas. He had been clamouring for reform within the army long before Shorncliffe. A very physically fit man himself, Moore emphasised the importance

of keeping soldiers healthy and well-exercised. Frustrated with the poor performance of his troops in the harsh climate of the West Indies, he wrote the following to his superior, General Abercromby: “With a Roman instead of modern exercise and discipline, the troops in the West Indies might, I am convinced, be kept healthy. ” Furthermore, he had the ear of the Commander in Chief, Prince Frederick, the Duke of York. The Commander in Chief was himself a proactive military reformer who had a hand in the creation of the Experimental Corps of Riflemen. To him, John Moore was the obvious choice to preside over the training of light infantry at Shorncliffe. At the dawn of the 19th century, Britain was desperately in need of reforms for its ground troops. Though secure in its naval supremacy, Britain had no answer to France’s land army. A clear disparity between the two armies was in the quality of their light infantry. In 1794, General Jone Money made the following observation about the British: “Light infantry men who have been trained on the parade ground to fire in platoon… runs his firelock through the hedge and fires where he sees smoke and continues to do so for as long as his ammunition lasts. ” By way of contrast, an opposing French chasseur would “conceal himself immediately, peep through the hedge and never fire till he sees an object to fire at. ” Money observed that throughout an hour’s skirmishing exchange, a British light infantryman might fire thirty ineffectual shots, and his French counterpart five or six accurate ones. Sustained fire by platoon was effective, but only against the large target presented by an enemy battalion. Moreover, why were British light infantrymen nearly indistinguishable from their comrades in the line? Light infantry in a British battalion accounted for one company out of ten. This differed from the French system, which favoured dedicated regiments of skirmishers known as chasseurs and tirailleurs. This composite organisation of battalions was detrimental to the training of light infantry, which was dependent on the knowledge of regimental light company officers. This often left much to be desired. The utility of dedicated light infantry regiments was recognised and duly implemented across the English Channel. The 5th Battalion of the 60th Royal American Regiment, founded in December of 1799, was the first of these. This was swiftly followed by the creation of the Experimental Corps of Riflemen, with other regiments undergoing a conversion from the traditional composite battalion structure to a light infantry composition. Between the dissolution of the Treaty of Amiens in 1803 and the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, a land invasion of Britain was a serious possibility. There is no doubt that this looming threat influenced the increased focus on light infantry training and even the decision to concentrate troops around Shorncliffe. The French invasion force gathering around Boulogne would eventually number 115,000 strong and was complemented by hundreds of transport vessels and landing craft. Correspondingly, Britain prepared to defend its shores. Martello towers were constructed along the south coast. A volunteer force of a staggering 380,000 was by December 1803. John Moore had been appointed to command the Southern Military District of England the previous year, a role that involved preparing Britain for an invasion. In a letter written to Lieutenant-General David Dundas in July 1803, Moore discussed the best means of victory against an invasion force. He wrote that “England is a country so well stocked that no effort will remove to any distance the means of subsistence from the French. ” Any army that successfully disembarked could take enough from the English countryside to sustain itself. Moore’s proposed solution was to, in his words, “make the enemy’s stay as short as possible. ” In effect, to strike hard as soon as the first French boots plunged into the surf at Dover. In a letter written to his mother in February 1803, Moore was certain that any French landing attempt would be along that stretch of coastline: “The collection at Boulogne can only mean this part of the coast, and I am pleased with the prospect of seeing the first of it. ” Shorncliffe camp was ideally placed then, being a mere ten miles from where an invasion was likely to take place. The focus on light infantry training, whilst necessary in any campaign undertaken by the British, was especially important for home defence. Moore’s travels around the South of England made him optimistic that the British populace would offer the French spirited resistance. However, the undulating hills, woodlands and small towns between the South Coast and London would play into the hands of the French army’s expert skirmishers. Britain needed skilled light troops

of its own to defend its shores and to threaten France’s martial dominance on the continent. Though well situated, the camp itself was hardly the finished article, comprised of earthworks with a defensive ditch around its perimeter. The plans for the redoubt were drawn up in 1794. This illustration shows circular structures on the northeast and southwest of the ramparts, likely intended to be mounts for cannons, with corresponding magazines to store gunpowder behind each one. A lack of archaeological evidence suggests that these were never built. The redoubt was similarly lacking in permanent infrastructure for the soldiers themselves, which would not be built until the 1820s. The men of Shorncliffe had to make do with temporary buildings and tents, an arrangement that Moore himself described as “wet and bleak. ” The redoubt was certainly underdeveloped, but the surrounding farmland lent itself to the training of light infantry. The first regiment to arrive at Shorncliffe was the Experimental Corps of Riflemen, ordered there by John Moore in October 1802. Though in its infancy, the Corps had already seen battle in Spain and Denmark and was thus an effective proof of concept for the British light infantry regiment. The following January, their name would be changed to the more succinct 95th Rifles. The 52nd ‘Oxfordshire’ regiment was the next addition to the Shorncliffe garrison. Arriving in June of 1803, it was untested in light infantry warfare, having only been converted the previous January. Moore oversaw its transition from the traditional battalion structure to light infantry, and stipulated that the most “intelligent, handy and active” men be selected to remain in the 52nd. The rest were placed into the newly formed 96th Foot and sent off to Ireland. The process of selecting officers was equally painstaking. Moore wanted the process to be meritocratic but was conscious of offending those who didn’t make the grade. In a letter to General Robert Brownrigg on the 17th of January 1803, Moore suggested that “these officers least adapted to the service may, of themselves, apply to be removed to the 96th. ” In that same letter he recommended Kenneth Mackenzie to lead the newly formed regiment, having witnessed the Scot training the light company of the 90th Foot in Minorca a few years prior. The 43rd ‘Monmouthshire’ regiment was similarly converted to light infantry on the 17th of July 1803 and would join the other two regiments at Shorncliffe a year later. The final addition to the camp was the 5th battalion of the 60th ‘Royal American’ regiment, serving under Lieutenant-Colonel Francis de Rottenburg. De Rottenburg was a light infantry specialist, whose literature on the subject was avidly consumed by Moore. The ‘Royal American’ was an amalgamation of German sharpshooter regiments that had served independently within the British Army, specifically Hompesch’s Jägers and Lowenstein’s Chasseurs. Like the 95th, they wore green and were armed with rifles. The Shorncliffe system of training can be summarised as a balance between drill and marksmanship, taking place in a training environment that prioritised professionalism, good health and ingenuity in its soldiers and officers. A training split that covered both regular and light infantry drilling was crucial to train a soldier who could shoot equally well from the front rank as from behind a tree. Details about training at Shorncliffe can be inferred from manuals written by Shorncliffe officers, as well as memoirs and letters. In August 1805, General Moore described a schedule of daily marksmanship training, light drills in the morning, and close order drills in the afternoons. The methodology of marksmanship training was given plenty of consideration. De Rottenburg’s manual proposed a target of five feet in diameter. Any smaller and inexperienced marksman would frequently miss and not know how to adjust his aim for the subsequent shot. Too big, and the target would be too easy and promote careless aiming. This system of musketry was broadly adopted by the Shorncliffe regiments. Colonel Coote Manningham of the 95th favoured a target four feet in diameter, further suggesting a drawing of a 6-foot-tall man on canvas to simulate enemy combatants. Soldiers were ranked based on their marksmanship and progressed upwards in range as their skills improved. Like marksmanship, drilling was split into progressions. Captain John Cross’ 1823 manual lays out the drilling practices of the 52nd regiment dating back to 1804 and provides insight into this process. Recruits were first drilled in a single rank of four or five men, at which point they learnt the most basic of commands: standing at ease and standing to attention. As the group size increased, so did the discipline, timing and cooperation demand of the drill exercises. Light

infantry drills were relatively complicated and were introduced after the basics of close order drills had been ingrained. One such drill was the transition from close to extended order. Extending outwards from the place in the line that the bugle sounded, a company would adopt a loose spacing of 1. 5 metres between files. The men in the rear rank would then step to the left, standing offset from the men in the front rank and allowing them an unimpeded view of the enemy. Cooperation between the front and rear file-man was critical, as the soldier in the second rank had to keep notice of the distance and tell the man in front when to stop. Battalion drills appear last in this manual. Amongst many other things, battalions were drilled on the transition from a column formation into a line, the two-rank formation that maximised a battalion’s firepower. They were drilled on forming squares to receive cavalry from either line or column formation. Columns in the British Army comprised each company in a battalion marching in a double rank line, one after the other. The most spread-out battalion column was the open column, where the distance between each company exceeded the distance across its front. From an open column, a square would be formed by the leading two companies closing to form the front. The middle four companies would wheel ninety degrees to form the sides of the square. The rear two companies formed the back of the square. Battalions marched in columns of varying density from an open column at one extreme to a close column formation with a 5-yard interval between companies at the other. A square formed from a close column of companies was the most versatile. This formation allowed troops on the move to form a square under the threat of cavalry quickly and would be deployed by the Light Division to great effect during the Peninsular War. Due to the lack of space between companies, the files at the edge of these centre companies would effectively become the front rank of the square’s flanks. The resulting square was more compact than the typical hollow infantry square, with fewer muskets in the front ranks, but could be formed in a matter of seconds. This formation, therefore, traded firepower for speed and would prove to be of great use in the Peninsular War. Battalion manoeuvres were nothing new, but the range of the Shorncliffe system was what set it apart from conventional drilling practices. Though trained in skirmishing and sharpshooting, the soldiers of Shorncliffe were just as ready to take their place in the line and deliver devastating volley fire or redeploy to receive cavalry. The myriad aspects of drilling could be executed to a degree of competency that made these regiments the envy of the rest of the army. The training of officers was every bit as exhaustive as that of the men they led. Lieutenant Cooke of the 43rd regiment recounts how he and his contemporaries were drilled alongside recruits until they could march, shoot and skirmish every bit as competently as the men who they were to command. This was as necessary as it was revolutionary. A light infantry officer had to keep up with his men. When a body of light infantry assumed an extended formation, they did so outwards from where their captain was situated, for he was expected to be in the thick of the action. Arthur Wellesley allegedly labelled this type of training “contrary to our national feelings” before later changing his opinion. While the army expected professionalism, training officers like raw recruits was unusual in such a hierarchical organisation and culture at large. Shorncliffe training was holistic, too. A soldier’s health, attitude towards his comrades, and education were taken every bit as seriously as his ability to skirmish or march to the commands barked by officers. Clean barracks were considered crucial to the health and wellbeing of the men. The mess was expected to be orderly and well stocked. During his 1803 lectures, Colonel Manningham impressed on the officers of Shorncliffe that they should “look well to the diet of their men. ” Manningham’s Regulations for the 95th further specified that every soldier in the rank and file save corporals, buglers and chosen men had to take turns at cooking. According to the same regulations, reading and arithmetic education was compulsory for NCOs and encouraged amongst privates. Moore fostered an attitude of mutual respect between officers and men, despite operating in a military culture that viewed the liberal use of the lash as the final word on discipline. Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Wilson said of the 52nd that “the cat o’nine tails is never used, and yet discipline is there seen in the highest state of perfection. ” Since his posting on St Lucia, Moore had felt the need for “a new discipline,” and this wish was realised at Shorncliffe. Initiative won out over blind obedience, and respect triumphed over fear. The regiments trained at Shorncliffe had the opportunity to prove their worth in

the Anglo-Portuguese army that fought for the liberation of the Iberian Peninsula. From 1809 onwards, the 43rd, 52nd and 95th served together under the irascible yet competent Robert Craufurd. On the 5th of May, 1811, the Light Division came to the rescue of Major-General William Houston’s 7th Division at the battle of Fuentes de Onoro and, in doing so, put their status as an elite body of soldiers beyond doubt. The 7th Division occupied the town and engaged in fierce close quarters fighting with French infantry. Houston’s men were ejected from Fuentes de Onoro and pushed from the frying pan into the fire. Out in the open, the 7th was forced into squares by Louis-Pierre Montbrun’s cavalry division. With two miles of open ground to cover to reach the safety of the British lines, the 7th found itself in serious trouble. The Light Division appeared and was able to cover the withdrawal of the 7th. They then had the unenviable task of covering the same two miles, harassed by cavalry. The Light Division was able to protect itself by retreating in alternating squares and marching between formations in close columns of companies. This was executed with Montbrun’s cavalry keeping a watching brief, ready to take advantage of any weakness exhibited by Craufurd’s troops. That the Light Division was called upon to save a regular infantry division and trusted to extricate itself from the same perilous situation speaks to its reputation as a body of men that could be counted on. The training conducted at Shorncliffe played a huge part in this. Unlike their green-coated comrades in the 95th, the 43rd and 52nd were newly converted light infantry regiments prior to Shorncliffe. Yet they proved to be amongst the best in the force. Captain John Kincaid of the 95th had nothing but admiration for them. He identified “our old and gallant associates, the 43rd and the 52nd as part of ourselves, for they bore their share in everything…Wherever we were, they were. ” The emphasis on light infantry training past the turn of the nineteenth century was a key part in Britain’s land-bound successes in the Napoleonic wars. The light infantryman who could think on his feet and be trusted with frontline combat as well as campaign duties like reconnaissance, was a significant step in the direction of the modern soldier. We hope you enjoyed this video. More videos on the various elite military units of world history are on the way, so make sure you are subscribed and have pressed the bell button to see it. Please consider liking, subscribing, commenting, and sharing - it helps immensely. Our patrons and YouTube members can watch more than 200+ exclusive videos - join their ranks via the link in the description or by pressing the join button under the video to watch these weekly videos, learn about our schedule, get early access to our videos, access our private discord, and much more. This is the Kings and Generals channel, and we will catch you on the next one.