Taiwan is Not Venezuela

Friday, January 2nd was a day like any other for Nicolás Maduro. The President of Venezuela posted on Telegram about his “productive meeting” earlier that day, before retiring to bed at his compound in Caracas. By that same time on Saturday, he was sitting in a Brooklyn prison. In those fateful 24 hours, Maduro and his wife were captured at home by a team of U. S. Army Commandos, brought by helicopter to the USS Iwo Jima a hundred miles off the coast, transferred to New York via 757 from Guantanamo Bay, and processed through DEA headquarters, before being taken to the notorious Metropolitan Detention Center. But before the world could process the shock of what just happened, attention quickly turned to Taiwan. If the U. S. president could pick up the phone, order special forces to invade its smaller, weaker neighbor in the cover of night, arrest its, quote, "illegitimate" leader for violating U. S. law, impose a naval blockade, and, quote “run” the country from afar — many wondered — well, why can’t China do the same with its “defiant” neighbor, Taiwan? After all, judged on its own terms, Operation “Absolute Resolve” was an unequivocal tactical success. No Americans were killed, Maduro was in U. S. custody within hours, and whatever diplomatic consequences that followed were inadequate to make it change course. Did the United States just give China the “green light” to invade Taiwan? Well, we don’t need to speculate how each of these countries would answer this question because they have… Predictably, Beijing rejects the comparison entirely. In its eyes, Taiwan is legally part of China, making it an “internal affair” unburdened by international law, unlike America’s invasion of a sovereign, foreign nation. Amusingly, Taiwan agrees — though obviously for very different reasons. One of its lawmakers summarized the ruling party’s position quite succinctly, saying “China is not the U. S., and Taiwan is not Venezuela. ” Nor does Trump see any parallels. When asked, he explained why Maduro’s arrest was justified, and, by implication, why he believes a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is not. Now, you’re surely thinking: one, two, if not all three of these answers are transparently self-serving… nonsense. But, for our purposes here, let’s set all that aside. This video is not about the morality or legal-ity of Maduro’s capture. It’s not even really about whether there are objective parallels between Taiwan and Venezuela. My argument is that Xi Jinping’s decision to invade Taiwan will be based on his own perception and his own, internal logic — right or wrong. Likewise, Trump’s decision to intervene will be based on his. In other words, Maduro’s capture will have very little, if any, effect on either the likelihood or timing of a Chinese invasion. On January 2nd, Beijing saw the U. S. as a self-interested and hypocritical bully, using high-minded principles like “international law” as thinly-veiled excuses to promote its own, narrow objectives. And on January 3rd… it still believed that. On the 2nd, Washington saw Taiwanese self-governance as beneficial to American interests. And nothing over the next 24 hours changed its mind. Beijing has no trouble denouncing Maduro’s capture just days after conducting its own military drills against Taiwan. Washington has no trouble defending “Taiwanese democracy” just days after capturing Maduro. Sure, you might say, politicians may never be swayed by charges of hypocrisy, but the rest of us are. It’s clear that much of the world does see parallels between Taiwan and Venezuela. After a Chinese attack, America would ideally assemble as large a coalition as possible — isolating Beijing with sanctions. And the more public perception is on America’s side, the easier that task would be. There’s certainly a kernel of truth here: America is running dangerously low on global credibility. But if there’s one thing that could instantly wipe the slate clean, unite the democratic world, and galvanize support for Taiwan, it’s precisely… a Chinese invasion of Taiwan! Nothing inspires a renewed sense of moral certainty or civic solidarity quite like an unprovoked attack — just ask George Bush on September 11th, 2001. Feelings of justice aside, there’s also just cold, hard realism.

The small handful of countries whose assistance would be most critical to repelling a Chinese attack are also those that have the most personally at stake thanks to their sheer proximity. Japan, for instance, is both, by far, the most important (non-U. S. ) partner and the most likely to actually materialise in the event of a war. Regardless of what the Japanese public thinks of the United States, its leaders have been clear: they consider an invasion of Taiwan to be a, quote, “existential threat. ” When the chips are down and bullets are fired, few democracies would side with China simply because they dislike Americans. Even those with the benefit of distance — like Europe — would likely be shocked into action. Russia’s war in Ukraine may be geographically closer, but a Chinese invasion would ripple through nearly every aspect of our lives. In December, a group of experts was asked to assess the likely outcomes of such a war. They predicted, quote “highly probable… near-total embargoes” with the world’s second largest economy, leading to “globally life-altering economic costs. ” The COVID-era supply chain disruptions would seem tame by comparison. But ultimately, it’s not clear how much any of this will truly matter. Sanctions are often righteous, sometimes useful, but rarely decisive. We’ve seen that firsthand during Russia’s war with Ukraine. Even if all of these assumptions are wrong — even if Maduro’s capture so thoroughly and so permanently disillusions the world that a Chinese attack is met with shrugs or empty lip service, it may not make much of a difference. What does matter — now, more than ever — is raw military power. Remember, we know for a fact that Beijing wants to absorb Taiwan. It’s been very clear about this for the last, oh… 75 years. And since it hasn’t done what it so desperately wants to do, it follows that it can’t — at least, and this is the important part — at an acceptable cost. Like any other ruler, Xi weighs risk against reward — hoping to extract as much as possible for the lowest cost. If he could take Taiwan through non-violent coercion, he surely would. If not — which seems increasingly likely as the mood in Taiwan hardens against Beijing — he assesses the odds of successfully taking it by force. …Which means: three variables will largely determine if and when China invades: China’s military capabilities, Taiwan’s military capabilities, and America’s willingness to intervene. The United States can only give China, quote, “permission” to invade by adjusting the latter two knobs. Everything else is barely a footnote — including, frankly, what the average German or Italian or even American voter thinks. After all, Beijing is certainly not trying to win a global popularity contest when it comes to Taiwan — domestic Chinese legitimacy is all that matters. Now, about that first variable: We know Xi is aware of his own military deficiencies because he’s fired nearly everyone. At China’s 20th Party Congress in 2022, there were six men, aside from Xi, on the Central Military Commission — its highest military authority. One by one, five of them have been purged in the 4 years since. China’s most senior general, in fact, was placed “under investigation” just weeks ago. Needless to say, you don’t typically throw your army into disarray shortly before launching the highest stakes war in your nation’s history. Xi is clearly aware of and concerned about some combination of corruption, disloyalty, and/or incompetence within his ranks — enough to risk projecting an unflattering image of the PLA abroad. We also know Beijing is aware of Taiwan’s growing capabilities. President Lai Ching-te recently announced a doubling of defense spending from 2. 4 to 5% of GDP by 2030. And not two months ago, the Trump administration approved $11 billion worth of weapon sales — the largest ever package. The last variable, of course, is more intangible, and thus, harder to measure. The best evidence we have that Xi at least suspects the U. S. might defend Taiwan is simply that he hasn’t yet invaded — not during Obama or Biden or Trump’s tenure. With a population 60 times bigger and an economy 20 times bigger, after all, there’s no question China could defeat Taiwan if it were thrown to the wolves.

Perhaps the clearest and most immediate “triumph” for China following Maduro’s capture has been its newfound rhetorical ammunition. Chinese diplomats have been working overtime since January portraying America as a reckless hypocrite. The question, however, is how effective Beijing will be in converting the world’s very real distrust of the United States into something more elusive: active support for China. Xi has placed his country in a poor position to capitalize on unease about Washington. Rather than staking out some new alternative global system, he’s often simply followed in America’s footsteps — ignoring international law when convenient in the South China Sea, breaching the Sino-British Joint Declaration in Hong Kong, and taking America’s post-9/11 xenophobia to new heights in Xinjiang. Now, some argue that, while America may not have given Beijing a “green light,” it at least offered a template — a model to emulate. But if Xi did study Maduro’s capture… it wouldn’t have been of much use. His goal is to permanently annex and reshape Taiwan — top to bottom — in its own autocratic image. Operation Absolute Resolve was a surgical extraction of two people — a mission American forces are uniquely qualified for. There’s a reason, after all, Trump kept its scope so narrow, even leaving Maduro’s Vice President in place — occupying any country is extremely costly and extremely difficult. Whereas, this would be only step one of a hundred for Beijing. It would then have to suppress and govern twenty-three million hostile subjects. Few in Caracas shed tears for Maduro. Polls, in fact, show a majority of Latin Americans hold positive views about his removal — 87% of Costa Ricans and 78% of Chileans, for example. Anyone captured by China, meanwhile, would instantly become a historic martyr. Unlike Maduro’s government, the ruling party in Taiwan — and its long, formal line of succession — have strong, democratic legitimacy. And the Taiwanese people would surely put up a spirited fight. Maduro’s capture came, relatively speaking, out of nowhere. Taiwan, on the other hand, has been preparing for exactly one war for its entire existence. Venezuela’s military was weak, with only about 20-30 aging combat aircraft. Taiwan buys weapons from the world’s superpower. Finally, a Chinese invasion would be a tremendous logistical feat, especially for a country that hasn’t fought a single war in 50 years, and across the rough, storm-prone Taiwan strait, no less. Needless to say, an attack of this scale wouldn’t come as a surprise. If there’s any lesson to be learned from Venezuela, it’s that even the United States military is often forced to settle for pretty modest ambitions — “running” Venezuela (as it were) indirectly and from afar. Now, on the flip side, others have argued that Maduro’s capture actually delays China’s plans, or, at least, unsettles Beijing. First, they say, it dispelled the myth that Trump is an isolationist, concerned only about what happens within America’s borders. Nor are his ambitions confined to a narrow “sphere of influence. ” As last year’s strikes in Iran demonstrate, Trump is willing to intervene far outside North and South America. Second, the operation’s success proves the U. S. is far from a “paper tiger. ” Despite Chinese narratives of American decline, it still wields tremendous influence thousands of miles away. The president picks up the phone and power changes hands on the other side of the planet. Finally, they argue, it exposed Chinese weakness. After rising to power in 1999, Hugo Chávez quickly pivoted Venezuela away from the U. S. orbit and toward China, visiting Beijing more often than any other Latin American president. More recently, in 2023, China upgraded its relationship with Venezuela to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” making it second only to the “core” group of Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea. At the heart of this friendship was a trade: Caracas needed cash — ideally with no questions asked — and Beijing needed crude. China bought north of 80% of Venezuela’s oil. And Venezuela, in turn, used that money to buy Chinese weapons, becoming its number one buyer in Latin America. All that, of course, is now in jeopardy. Not only did Beijing lose its closest friend on the continent, the argument goes

but its powerlessness was laid bare for all to see. That Telegram post Maduro shared shortly before his capture on January 2nd was about his meeting with Chinese diplomats. In other words: just hours after thanking his “all-weather” friend Xi Jinping, Maduro found himself handcuffed and blindfolded on a U. S. warship, while Chinese diplomats were left awkwardly wondering if their next meeting was still on. There’s some truth to this argument, but it too is wildly overstated. For starters: it’s true that China bought 80% of Venezuela’s oil, yet Venezuelan oil accounted for a mere 4% of China’s oil imports. Venezuelan oil is heavy and sour — not the lighter kind it prefers from Russia and Saudi Arabia. And because it was sanctioned, it had to take a bizarre, two-month route to arrive in Asia. Its only advantage was price — no one else would dare buy it. It’s still unclear whether and how much of this oil the U. S. will let China keep buying — Trump initially said “yes,” but has since earmarked all of it for American refineries. Still, even if these imports dry up completely, Beijing will have no trouble making up for the 4% elsewhere. And while Venezuela was indeed among China’s closest friends, some perspective is probably in order. Remember: Beijing isn’t exactly the world’s “prom queen. ” It doesn’t really have any close “friends” so much as it has business partners. With only one or two exceptions, the modern PRC has never truly entangled its future with any other country — certainly not in any way it couldn’t quickly back out of when the “friendship” stopped being profitable. When Maduro’s power slipped in 2015 and 19, for instance, China quickly and quietly met with his Western-leaning opposition. Likewise, China has never maintained the capacity to intervene outside of its immediate periphery. Even during coups abroad, Chinese citizens are often left to fend for themselves while American expats are safely extracted. In other words: while Maduro and Xi wore friendship bracelets, the former never expected China to swoop in, guns blazing, to save him. Beijing doesn’t have the ability to do so and it never claimed to. One area where China actually does have more to lose, is debt. Over the past 25 years, Venezuela has borrowed about one hundred billion dollars from China — and about 13 to $15 billion is still outstanding. In a funny reversal of the “debt trap” narrative China is often accused of, it’s now Beijing that seems to be stuck in a “debt trap” of its own. With Venezuela under Washington’s thumb, China may never see this money again. 15 billion, of course, is not nothing. Still, it certainly won’t bankrupt the world’s second largest economy. So, add all this up and what do you get? Whether a net win or loss for China, Maduro’s capture is far from the geopolitical Super Bowl. And don’t take my word for it: full-time Taiwan scholars like Ryan Hass have said as much. Quote, “Beijing is playing a different game and Venezuela is not a huge piece of it. ” Following nearly every geopolitical crisis, there’s a sprint, particularly on social media, to instantly make it about something else. And Taiwan is very often that “something else. ” Before Venezuela, there was the war in Ukraine, which, according to who you asked, was either wonderful or terrible news for Taiwan’s future. We project our own thinking onto Xi Jinping — assuming he sees the world as we do — when, in fact, his perceptions of Taiwan were shaped decades before Maduro’s capture. By taking a step back and observing history unfold over a much longer time horizon, we can hopefully gain a larger perspective and see how misleading these comparisons are. That’s what I try to do with these videos and also what I love about “Oldest and Newest Places on Earth,” Joe Scott’s new hour forty-minute documentary. I just watched it today, as I record this, on Nebula — today’s sponsor and its exclusive home. And while it’s not about Taiwan or China, that’s sort of what makes it a great recommendation here — it’s wonderfully disconnected from the torrent of current events we’re constantly bombarded with, making it the perfect escapist watch — and, even better, one you’ll feel inspired and moved by. In short: Joe set out to visit the geologically oldest and youngest places on planet earth. You watch as he travels all the way to the Arctic Circle in Canada's Northwest Territories by floatplane, then to Hawaii's Kilauea volcano.

It’s way more interesting than any documentary about rocks has any right to be — I learned a ton in the process — and, frankly, it’s just delightful watching Joe plan and orchestrate such a massive project. Nebula is home to dozens of other amazing Originals… shows that make you laugh out loud, like one of my personal favorites, “Abolish Everything,” the live comedy debate show… …shows that, if you’re like me, catch you up on all the fascinating history you were never taught in school, like RealLifeLore’s “Modern conflicts” series, which teaches you about the Origins of al-Qaeda and the US Invasion of Iraq… …and shows that visually astonish and inspire you, like neo’s “Under Exposure,” featuring these amazing 3D renders of things like the Titanic. Nebula is ad-free and even gives you Guest Passes, so you can watch along with friends and family for no additional cost. Now, normally, Nebula costs $6 a month. But you can get it for just half that by signing up for a year with the link on screen or in the description now. That’s just $2. 50 a month for all the Originals I mentioned and more. If you’re not a fan of subscriptions, you can also get $200 off Nebula Lifetime with the Lifetime link below.