Why Russia and Kazakhstan Pretend to be Allies

Why Russia and Kazakhstan Pretend to be Allies

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Segment 1 (00:00 - 05:00)

On January 2nd, 2022, the world’s attention suddenly turned to a country few had ever thought about: Kazakhstan. about it because, frankly, there was very little to think about. Politically, Kazakhstan was one of the most boring countries on the planet. For its first twenty-eight years of independence, the former Soviet republic was ruled by just one man: Nursultan Nazarbayev. And Nazarbayev was no radical. He wasn’t known for making bold or unexpected moves, nor did he allow anyone else to. There were no real debates to participate in, no major reforms to watch, or competitive elections to follow. Even his “retirement” from the presidency in 2019 was relatively uneventful. Officially, this was the beginning of an exciting “new era. ” In reality, Nazarbayev granted himself lifelong immunity and maintained control over key parts of government. His hand-picked successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, was seen as little more than a puppet. In other words, nothing happened in Kazakhstan for thirty years. Then, in January 2022, thirty years happened in just a few days. It all started here, in the country’s vast Western periphery — home to some of the world’s largest oil deposits. By Central Asian standards, this oil had made Kazakhstan extraordinarily rich. Its GDP per capita is, by far, the highest in the region — eleven times that of its neighbor Tajikistan, for instance. And you can see this wealth reflected in its capital, Astana, parts of which are every bit as shiny and modern (and over-the-top) as Las Vegas, Dubai, or Macau. But you wouldn’t know it way over here — a 38-hour drive away — where, incidentally, that very wealth was being created. This vast, empty, and poor expanse feels like a world away from the high-rises in Astana. Now, when the pie was growing — when prosperity was in the air — it was easy to overlook this stark inequality and rampant corruption. Despite his tight grip on the country — or, perhaps because of it — experts generally agree that Nazarbayev was genuinely popular for most of his reign. But when times get tough — as they inevitably will in a country so dependent on the price of a single commodity — people start paying closer attention to how the pie is split. And, needless to say, an outrageously large slice ended up in the pockets of the president and his family. Discontent had been slowly brewing since oil prices collapsed in 2014, even after which the government did little to diversify the economy. Meanwhile, the government began drinking its own Kool-Aid. Like many authoritarian states, it grew so effective at manufacturing the people’s approval that it lost the ability to accurately measure it. Nazarbayev, complacent and out-of-touch, continued building his increasingly extravagant cult of personality. The capital city, its airport, and university were all named after him. The economy was stagnating. Nazarbayev had overstayed his welcome. And the carefully choreographed “leadership transition” in 2019 only reminded voters of how little their opinions mattered. Then, in 2022, the government threw fuel on the fire — fittingly, by dramatically raising the price of fuel. For these hard-working, long-disregarded oil workers, this was the final straw. Not only did the fruits of their labor end up a thousand miles away but those corrupt officials now had the audacity to turn around and double the price they sold the same liquid back to them. And when the dam holding back this anger finally broke, it started pouring in from all directions. Protests spread quickly across the country. Buildings were set on fire, property destroyed, and hundreds of civilians killed by police, who called this a coordinated attack. For the first time ever, the government seemed to be losing control. Then, President Tokayev did something equally unprecedented: he invited thousands of foreign troops into the country to help “restore order. ” Officially, they were sent by the Collective Security Treaty Organization — a smaller, six-nation version of NATO.

Segment 2 (05:00 - 10:00)

But it’s an open secret that Moscow, as the largest and most powerful member, pulls the strings. Within days, the protests were contained and Tokayev’s power was cemented. Since then, remarkably little information has been released about the worst political crisis in the nation’s history. Some outside observers suspect that one or more political elites may have tried to use this grassroots movement as an opportunity to overthrow the government. After the dust settled, Tokayev purged several high-ranking officials, including Nazarbayev himself. But one thing seemed certain: If Kazakhstan wasn’t already a Russian client state before, it was now. Putin saved Tokayev’s political, if not physical, life. Surely this help didn’t come for free. Many saw this as the end of Astana’s true independence, speculating that Russian troops would linger in the country indefinitely. And given that it would invade Ukraine less than one month later, this was not an unreasonable assumption. But, strangely, that’s not what happened. The troops left two weeks later. And if Tokayev owed a debt to Putin, he never repaid it. Quite the opposite, in fact… That June, Russia held its annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum — its version of Davos. The purpose of the event is to showcase Russia’s international prestige and influence. Instead, it was humiliated — and by none other than Tokayev. Sitting on stage next to Putin, less than 5 months after Russian forces came to his rescue, he boldly announced that Kazakhstan would refuse to recognize Moscow’s two separatist regions in Ukraine. Putin was furious. The very next day, Moscow mysteriously cut Kazakhstan off from a key Black Sea port it relies on to export two-thirds of its oil. Tokayev was conspicuously absent from the twenty-twenty-three St. Petersburg Forum. Clearly, these are not the actions of “close allies” — a term that implies a degree of mutual trust and loyalty that Astana and Moscow simply don’t have. Nor is the former — with its public acts of defiance — the latter’s puppet. And yet, they have most people fooled… Putin has visited Kazakhstan more than any other country, including Belarus. Both are members of the Eurasian Economic Union, giving each other’s citizens the right to freely move and work between borders without a passport. And in 2023, Putin explicitly called Kazakhstan Russia’s “closest ally. ” Look closely, however, and you can see that it’s all a carefully rehearsed performance. World leaders, after all, don’t repeatedly “forget” the name of their closest ally’s president, which, anyone familiar with Putin’s antics will recognize as one of his signature “power moves. ” Whatever these two countries are, what they aren’t are allies. So, why do they both pretend otherwise? After the Soviet Union fell in 1991, the new Russian Federation had its hands full — to put it lightly. Mortality skyrocketed, optimism, and with it, birth rates, collapsed, and almost everything that could go wrong did go wrong. Only in Putin’s 2nd and 3rd terms was the domestic situation stable enough to begin looking outward. And look outward he did, calling the fall of the USSR the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” and wanting desperately to revive its imperial legacy. That spelled trouble for Russia’s neighbors — its so-called “near abroad” — particularly those with the “closest” historical, geographical, linguistic, and cultural ties to Moscow. And Kazakhstan was near the top of that list. It shares with Russia the longest, uninterrupted all-land border in the world. There were, at the time of its founding, as many ethnic Russians in the country as Kazakhs. And Russian, not Kazakh, is still the dominant language today. …Which meant that from the time it became independent, Nazarbayev had about twenty years of breathing room — twenty years to create a distinct national identity and mythology. …Which he did — at least, as much as one can in a single generation. But by 2014, it was becoming clear its time was up.

Segment 3 (10:00 - 15:00)

That February, Russia invaded Crimea — turning what was once a distant theoretical into an uncomfortable reality. Then, in August, Putin gave Nazarbayev the mother of all backhanded compliments, praising him for creating, quote, “a state in a territory that had never had a state before,” implying that Kazakhstan was something less than a “real” country. That it was artificial. And to cap that year off, oil prices plummeted — threatening both Kazakhstan’s economy and the economy on which it most closely depended — Russia’s. Putin, clearly, was eager to expand his “empire. ” But Nazarbayev was eager to retain his independence. So, the two reached a kind of unspoken arrangement: Moscow would tolerate Astana’s independence but… only if it stayed within its general “sphere of influence. ” In other words, it could keep its independence on most issues only if it surrendered its independence on certain “core,” sensitive ones. Thus, it had to pretend to be Russia’s ally — not to fool it, but to demonstrate the expected deference — in what became a kind of dysfunctional marriage. At the same time, giving Russia everything it asked for would defeat the purpose. The goal, after all, is to keep some amount of freedom. Kazakhstan has no desire to become Belarus — Moscow’s puppet. So, when Tokayev found himself losing control during the 2022 unrest, for example, he had no choice but to turn to Russia. Requesting help from anyone else would’ve crossed Moscow’s red line. This unprecedented act of deference, however, had to be followed up with an equally unprecedented act of defiance — refusing to support Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, publicly, and in front of Putin. Russia, likewise, has a similar calculus. Naturally, Putin would prefer to turn Kazakhstan into an obedient colony — reviving Russia’s role as the center of an empire. At the same time, it knows that the more forcefully it attempts to assert its will, the more Kazakhstan will feel the need to stridently assert its independence. Thus, it tolerates some defiance. As long as its neighbor doesn’t stray too far, the status quo is preferable to a long and costly war. It agreed to rescue Tokayev in 2022 because it saw this as a low-cost opportunity to strengthen its leverage over Kazakhstan. And it left after the dust had settled because Tokayev has proven his willingness to follow through on his end of the bargain — to stay within Russia’s general sphere of influence. Better him than someone else who might actively oppose Moscow’s interests. It pretends to be Kazakhstan’s ally because, at least for now, it believes this to be the most effective and cost-effective way to draw it closer. The tension in this arrangement, however — and the reason it may not last forever — is that, because Russia’s red lines were never precisely drawn, both sides are constantly trying to push the boundaries of what the other will tolerate. For Russia, this means subtly questioning the legitimacy of Kazakhstan as a sovereign state — always, of course, with some plausible deniability. Recall, for example, when Putin “complimented” Nazarbayev for creating a state where “none existed. ” Likewise, Putin will often emphasize their cultural and historical similarities. To the uninitiated, this looks like camaraderie — “we’re so much alike. ” To those in the know, it looks like a threat — implying that the border that separates them is artificial and unnecessary. For Kazakhstan, this means asserting its distinct, non-Russian identity. It’s in the process, for instance, of transitioning from writing the Kazakh language in Cyrillic to Latin — ostensibly, for the sake of “efficiency. ” It also pays citizens in the South — which is majority ethnic Kazakh — to relocate to the North — some areas of which are majority ethnic Russian. It claims its goal is to develop the Northern economy. In 1997, its capital was even moved from the South to the North, where it can now exert more influence. But since 2022, when Russian troops rescued Tokayev and later invaded Ukraine, this project has taken on a whole new urgency. Tokayev recently made a power move of his own

Segment 4 (15:00 - 18:00)

speaking to Putin not in Russian, which he also speaks, but in Kazakh. His government — which, needless to say, isn’t typically very fond of people marching in the streets — even allowed its citizens to protest the war in Ukraine. These acts of assertiveness, meanwhile, find Moscow at an especially delicate moment — when it feels internationally isolated. This could make it more sensitive to slights than usual. Indeed, prominent figures in the Russian media and even government have, in recent years, begun lashing out at Kazakhstan. Former President Dmitry Medvedev, for example, published a post saying its territory should be “returned to Russia,” before claiming his account was hacked. Others have warned Kazakhstan to, quote, “look at Ukraine carefully,” and “think seriously. ” During the twilight of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin published a list of borders Russia, quote, “reserved the right” to revise at a later date: The first was Abkhazia, which Russia would later invade in 2008. The second and third were Crimea and Donbas, both of which Russia invaded in 2014. And the fourth — very ominously — was northern Kazakhstan — whose fate still hangs in the balance. As far as Moscow is concerned, it gave Kazakhstan its independence and it can just as easily take it away. As Kazakhstan finds itself squeezed by not one but now two neighbors with expansionist ambitions, it could use all the creative thinking and problem-solving help it can get. Maybe it should check out today’s sponsor, Brilliant. Brilliant has courses on everything from strategy puzzles, to logic games, probability, and programming. The key to learning something new — in my opinion and theirs too — is to make the process fun, engaging, and rewarding. You’re more likely to keep learning to program in Python when you can see the fruits of your new knowledge with real, practical projects like creating a music recommendation algorithm for Spotify. And you’re more likely to try learning something new — like neural networks or quantum mechanics — when you’re gently guided with beautiful and interactive lessons. This, not rote memorization or dry textbooks, is the most effective way to truly understand a topic and cultivate a lifelong learning habit. Brilliant splits its courses into bite-sized lessons, meaning you can quickly learn something new with their iOS and Android apps in the car or on the train, instead of mindlessly scrolling social media. When you’re ready to try Brilliant completely free for 30 days, click the link on screen now or in the description below — that’s Brilliant. org/PolyMatter. Doing so will also get you 20% off an annual premium subscription. Go, pick whatever you want to learn, and start today!

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